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Abstract 
 
We analyze a model of multi-period monopoly in durable goods.  Taking into 
consideration the special conditions of software markets, we assume that there are no 
used software markets and that manufacturers stop selling older software when they 
introduce a replacement model.  We show that nominal as well as discounted (real) prices 
decrease over time but are above cost, thereby violating the Coase conjecture.  In 
contrast, when “new” durable goods are introduced by the monopolist which are only 
partially compatible with “old” durable goods, prices may increase over time.  This 
occurs when the intensity of network externalities arising from weak partial forward 
compatibility (influencing the demand of the old good from sales of the new one) is low 
compared to the intensity of network externalities arising from partial backward 
compatibility (influencing the demand of the new good from sales of the old one).  A new 
product introduced by an entrant is successful only when it has strong externalities 
arising from forward compatibility.  In this case, the entrant and the incumbent have 
opposite incentives regarding the degree of forward compatibility of the new product 
(that defines the extent of network externalities of the old product on consumers of the 
new one). 
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Durable Goods Monopoly with Network Externalities with 
Application to the PC Operating Systems Market 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During the last decade, the network externalities literature has grown 
considerably, but has paid relatively little attention to durable goods markets.  However, 
often durable goods exhibit network externalities.  In fact, very significant current 
litigation (US v. Microsoft) centers on the degree of competition in the market for 
operating systems, which are durable goods.  Surprisingly, although everyone recognizes 
that software is a durable good, almost all the arguments and discussion in the US v. MS 
case were made as if the software were a perishable good. 
 
Traditionally, economists have analyzed infinitely-lived durable goods.  The 
debate has centered on the validity of the Coase conjecture, which states that the 
infinitely-lived durable goods monopolist prices every period at marginal cost.  Much of 
the debate has centered on various technical details of the models, and the results on the 
validity of the Coase conjecture are mixed.2   
 
Robin Mason (1998) introduces network externalities in the standard model of 
durable goods that last forever and are sold in every instant up to infinity.3  He finds that 
the perfectly competitive and the monopoly solutions coincide, since in both cases prices 
equal marginal cost.  He also finds, as expected in his framework, that both the 
competitive market and the monopolist produce less than a planner who would fully 
internalize the externality. 
 
For software markets, the model of durable goods that live and are traded forever 
and is not very useful.  Of course, software is durable.  But, if most of the value of an 
operating system comes from software applications that work with it (and the network 
externalities they imply), the durability of the operating system is not infinite, but rather 
depends on how many applications are written for it.  The history of computer operating 
systems is littered with operating systems that were sometime successful and now are 
defunct.  So, in modeling the operating systems market, it makes sense to consider 
durable goods that have a finite economic life.  Even if software is assumed to have an 
infinite economic life, in modeling competitive interactions in the software market, it 
makes sense to allow the same product to be sold only during a few periods, to be 
replaced by another model later.   
 
                                                 
 
2  See Morch von der Fehr and Kuehn (1997) for a recent re-examination of the Coase conjecture in 
models without network externalities. 
 
3  Because it utilizes the standard Bellman technique, Mason’s (1998) model has the limitation that 
network externalities are not allowed to vary over time with the size of the evolving network. 
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The second interesting feature of the operating systems market, and more 
generally of software markets, is the lack of a used goods or secondary market.  This 
arises for three reasons.  First, often software is pre-installed and not portable to another 
computer.  Second, even when software is portable, it is often hard to uninstall it, so that 
the used software can be legally sold.  Third, often the license of software is not 
transferable to another user.  Thus, in a model of competition in operating systems, it 
makes sense to assume that there is no used goods market.4   
 
The third interesting feature of the operating systems market, and more generally 
of software markets, is that it is very common for a company to stop selling an old 
product when it introduces a new one.5  So, given the absence of a market for used 
software, a new product competes with older products of the same company only across 
time periods. 
 
The value of operating systems, even of very sophisticated operating systems, 
such as Windows or Unix is greatly enhanced by the existence of software applications 
that are compatible with the particular operating system.  The higher the availability and 
sales of compatible applications, the higher the value of an operating system.  Moreover, 
the higher the sales of an operating system, the more profitable are applications written 
for it.  These positive feedback effects can be summarized by assuming that that every 
unit of sales of an operating system increases the willingness to pay for that system.  This 
is commonly called the “network externality” or “network effect” of the sales of the 
operating system. 
 
It is natural for competitors in software markets to try to capture and benefit from 
network externalities to the extent that it is possible.  Thus, firms that design operating  
systems have strong incentives (i) to be compatible with existing applications, and run 
them better and faster if possible; and (ii) to promote the creation of applications 
compatible with their operating system.  By now, it is common to have a release of 
hundreds of new applications simultaneously with the release of an operating system.  
Thus, it makes sense for network externalities associated with an operating system to be 
modeled as appearing immediately at the date of the operating system’s release, while, of 
course, externalities can grow as more applications are written.6 
 
In a multi-good multi-period model, there are three types of compatibility, and 
each of these produces network externalities.  First, there is full compatibility between 
                                                 
 
4  Of course, there is a market for used personal computers which typically have some software 
installed.  I only argue that there is a lack of a robust market for used operating system software that is 
disembodied from the hardware. 
 
5  Of course, software companies typically provide support for the installed base of earlier versions 
for some time. 
 
6  This is in contrast with the model of Bensaid and Lesne (1996), where externality effects are 
delayed. 
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the operating system and its applications.  Second, when a new operating system is 
introduced in a future period, there is compatibility of the new operating system with 
existing (“old”) applications which we call “backward compatibility.”  Clearly, new 
operating systems gain substantial value from being backwardly compatible.  This may 
force the new product to be more similar to the old one, and therefore may intensify 
competition, if the older one is sold by a different company.  Firms have to balance the 
benefits of extensive network externalities created by backward compatibility with the 
potential drawback of more intense competition.  This is discussed in more detail in 
Economides and Flyer (1997) and in Jonard and Schenck (1998). 
 
It is also worth noting that the cycles of introductions of new operating systems 
and applications software do not have to coincide.  Moreover, depending on the technical 
differences between an old and a new operating system, new or upgraded applications 
software may be compatible under both the old and the new operating systems. 
 
The third type of compatibility is the degree of compatibility with an older 
operating system with applications written primarily for a new operating system.  We call 
this “forward compatibility.”  To some extent, through design choices, the manufacturer 
of a new operating system can control the degree to which applications written primarily 
for the new operating system are compatible with applications written for the older one.  
If it is certain that an application will be written for the new operating system, the 
manufacturer of the new operating system has an incentive to make it less forwardly 
compatible, so that the old operating system is deprived of the positive externalities.  On 
the other hand, if an application (or upgrade) compatible with the new operating system 
will be written only if some of its sales go to users of the old operating system, the 
manufacturer of the new operating system has an incentive to make it more forwardly 
compatible. 
 
Taking into account these features of software markets, we model a durable goods 
monopolist selling goods with network externalities.  We examine pricing and 
compatibility, as well as the incentive of a monopolist to introduce new goods.  We also 
examine the possibility of entry in later periods, and its effect on the monopolist’s 
pricing. 
 
  
2. The Benchmark Model 
 
 We first consider the benchmark model of durable goods monopoly with network 
externalities.  The primary example we have in mind is a computer operating system.  Let 
a durable good be sold during two periods.  The good is durable and lasts indefinitely 
after the first two periods.  Potential consumers are distributed uniformly in [0, 1] 
according to their willingness to pay for the good.  Each consumer can buy up to one unit 
of the good.  Each consumer has the choice of buying in period 1, buying in period 2, or 
not buying the durable good.  In the second period, the market (number of potential 
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customers) grows by  g  percent.7  Consumers also benefit from network externalities that 
are proportional to the size of sales.  
 
 We assume that here is no resale (secondary) market for used operating system 
software.  This is justified since often operating system software is pre-installed and not 
portable to another computer.  Moreover, even when the operating system software is 
portable, it is often hard to uninstall from the original computer, so that the used software 
can be legally sold, and often there are legal restrictions to resale.8 
 
 Durable goods sold in every period create network externalities.  In the back of 
our minds we have a model of complementary goods (software applications) that are 
more abundant and have higher sales as more of compatible durable goods are sold.  For 
example, the software applications market may be modeled as monopolistic competition 
with free entry in a circular model of differentiated products as in Economides (1996b).  
For simplicity, we assume that network externalities are linear in sales.  Moreover, when 
the same durable good is sold in every period, we assume that sales in either period 
contribute the same marginal network externality benefit. 
 
A consumer of willingness to pay (type)  a  who buys in period 1 receives utility 
 
u1 = a - p1 + k(d1 + d2b), 
 
where  di, i = 1, 2, are the sales in the ith period,  k > 0  is the degree of network 
externalities, 1 > b ≥ 0  is the discounting rate, and  pi  is the nominal price in period i.  
Similarly a consumer who buys in period 2  receives utility (discounted to the first 
period) 
 
u2 = b[a – p2 + k(d1 + d2)]. 
 
Notice that a consumer in period 1 receives the extra network benefit  k(1 - b)d1  
compared to a consumer in period 2.  This reflects consumption in period 1 of network 
benefits created in period 1.  Period 2 buyers get network externalities benefits in period 
2 from period 1 sales but can only receive them and consume them in period 2. 
 
Consumers with  u1 > u2  and  u1 > 0  buy in period 1, while consumers with u2 > 
u1  and u2 > 0 buy in period 2.   Defining as  a12 (by u1 = u2) the consumer who is 
indifferent between buying the good in period 1 and 2, and as  a20  (defined by u2 = 0) the 
consumer who is indifferent between buying the good in period 2 and not buying any 
good, we have the implicit definition of demand functions:9 
 
                                                 
7  The buyers who appear in period 2 can only buy in period 2. 
 
8 We also assume no delayed effects of externalities since software applications are introduced 
together with the operating system. 
 
9  The marginal consumers are:  a12 = (p1 - p2b)/(1 – b) - k d1,  a20 = p2 – k(d1 + d2). 
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d1 = 1 - a12(d1, d2), 
 
d2 = a12(d1, d2) - a20(d1, d2) + g(1 - a20(d1, d2)), 
 
where the last term in the second period demand arises from the growth of the market.  
Notice that sales of periods 1 and 2 appear on both sides of the demand system.  This is 
natural for goods with network externalities.  Expressing sales in each period as functions 
of prices only, we have: 
 
d1 = (1 - b - p1 + bp2)/[(1 - b)(1 – k)], 
 
d2 = [p1(1 – k – gk) - p2(1 + g – bg – k – gk) + g(1 - b)]/[(1 - b)(1 – k)(1 – k - kg)]. 
 
 Without loss of generality, we assume that costs are zero.  The monopolist’s 
profits, 
 
ΠM = p1d1 + bp2d2, 
 
are maximized at (nominal) prices 
 
p1* = p2* = 1/2.10 
 
Three observations are in order.  First, the equilibrium prices do not depend on the 
extent of network externalities, or even on the existence of network externalities, since 
they are independent of  k.  This result generalizes to an n-period durable goods 
monopoly, as shown in the appendix.  Second, price in period 1 is not lower than the 
discounted (real) price in period 2,  
 
p1* ≥ bp2* . 
 
This standard result in durable goods markets is valid in the presence of network 
externalities.  Indeed, if price were higher in period 2, all period 2 customers would 
switch to buying in period 1 since they would be paying no more (since then bp2* - p1* > 
0) as well as benefiting from consuming the good and the associated externalities in 
period 1 as well.11   
 
Third, prices are above marginal cost.  In fact, nominal prices are at the single-
period monopoly level. Thus, the Coase conjecture, that predicts price equal to marginal 
cost, fails.   
 
                                                 
10  Realized profits are : 
ΠM* = [1 + bg – k(1 + g)]/[4(1 - k)(1 - k - gk)]. 
 
11 For further discussion see Cabral, Salant, and Woroch (1999). 
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Also note that, in a market without growth, sales in the second period are zero, 
i.e., for  g = 0,  
 
d2* = 0. 
 
That is, the monopolist, prefers to sell all his output in the first period.12  This result 
generalizes to n-periods.  In an n-period model without market growth, the monopolist 
has positive sales only in the first period as shown in the appendix.  The intuition of this 
result is as follows.  Low prices in later periods interfere with the ability of the 
monopolist to extract surplus in earlier periods.  Also, selling in an earlier period is 
preferable for the monopolist to selling in a later period because of discounting.  Thus, 
when there is no market growth in later periods, the monopolist sells all output in the first 
period. 
 
 
3. New good introduction in durable goods monopoly 
 
We now consider the case when the second period good differs from the first 
period good.  This case models the introduction of new operating system software.  As is 
customary in software markets, we assume that the first period good is no longer sold in 
the second period.  
 
We assume that the second period good is only partially compatible with the older 
one.  Thus, same period demand externalities differ in intensity from demand 
externalities across periods.  This is a natural assumption since demand externalities arise 
out of applications that are compatible with the operating system.  In every period, a 
consumer enjoys externalities from applications that are fully compatible with his 
operating system, as well as from applications that are only partially compatible with his 
operating system.  We assume that externalities from fully compatible applications are 
proportional to same period sales.  Positive externalities to a consumer of operating 
system  i  from partially compatible applications are proportional to sales of operating 
system  j  since these applications were written for operating system j.  Moreover, we 
expect that the intensity of network externalities from partially compatible applications 
will be lower than the intensity network externalities from fully compatible applications. 
 
We define as backward compatibility the degree of compatibility of the second 
period operating system with first period applications.  We define as forward 
compatibility the degree of compatibility of the first period good with second period 
applications.   
 
A consumer of willingness to pay (type)  a  who buys in period  i, i = 1, 2, 
receives utility 
u1 = a - p1 + kd1 + md2b, 
 
                                                 
12  As the appendix shows, then sales in the first period are  d1* = 1/[2(1 - k)]. 
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u2 = b(a - p2 + nd1 + kd2), 
 
where  k  is the degree of network externalities from sales in the same good, m  is the 
intensity of network externalities to a good 1 consumer from sales good 2 (arising from 
partial forward compatibility), and n  is the intensity of network externalities to a good 2 
consumer from sales of good 1 (arising from partial backward compatibility).  As before, 
given marginal consumers  a12, a20, we have the implicit definition of demand functions: 
 
d1 = 1 - a12(d1, d2), 
 
d2 = a12(d1, d2) - a20(d1, d2) + g(1 - a20(d1, d2)). 
 
The fixed point of this mapping defines the demand functions in each period,13  
                                                                                 
d1(p1, p2),  d2(p1, p2). 
 
The monopolist’s profits, ΠM = p1d1 + p2d2, are maximized at prices  p1* , p2*.14   
 
 Notice that, in contrast with the benchmark model where the good did not change 
across periods, in the present case of new good introduction, it is possible for the price to 
increase during the second period.  This occurs when  m  is smaller than  n, 
  
m < n, 
 
i.e., when the intensity of network externalities arising from weak partial forward 
compatibility is low compared to the intensity of network externalities arising from 
partial backward compatibility.  This occurs when many of the applications written for 
the new operating system do not work (or work poorly) with the old operating system.15 
                                                 
13  The demand functions are: 
 
d1 = [1 + bgm – b(1 – m) – k(1 + g) - p1(1 – k -gk) + bp2(1 – m - gm)]/[1 - b – k(2 + g- bg) + k2(1 + g) + bm 
+ bn – bmn(1 + g)], 
 
d2 = [(n – k  + g( 1 – b – k + n) + (1 – n - gn)p1 - (1 – k + g – bg - gk)p2)]/[1 - b – k(2 + g - bg) + k2(1 + g) + 
bm + bn – bmn(1 + g)]. 
 
14 Equilibrium prices are: 
 
p1* = (2 - 2b - 4k - 2gk + 2bgk + 2k2  + 2gk2  + 2bm + bgm - b2gm - bkm -  bgkm + 2bn - bgn + b2gn + bkn 
+ bgkn - bmn - bgmn - bn2 - bgn2)/(4 - 4b - 8k - 4gk + 4bgk + 4k2  + 4gk2  + 4bm – bm – bgm2  + 4bn - 
2bmn - 2bgmn - bn2  - bgn2), 
 
p2* = (2 - 2b - 4k - 2gk + 2bg k + 2k2   + 2gk2   - m + 3bm + km + gkm + bm2  +  bgm2  + n + bn - kn - gkn 
- bmn - bgmn)/ )/(4 - 4b - 8k - 4gk + 4bgk + 4k2  + 4gk2  + 4bm – bm2  – bgm2  + 4bn - 2bmn - 2bgmn - bn2  
- bgn2). 
 
15  It can be shown that the price difference, p1* - p2*, has the same sign as  m – n, so that  p1* < p2*  ⇔  
m < n.  The proof is available from the author upon request. 
 
 8 
 
The monopolist has strong incentives to maximize both backward and forward 
compatibility.  It can be shown that the incentive to increase compatibility is proportional 
to the equilibrium demands, and therefore is positive.  
 
dΠM*/dn = dΠM*/dm = b(d1*)(d2*) > 0. 
 
Note that the monopolist has no incentive to create incompatibilities to disadvantage the 
consumers of period 1, since he benefits from profits of both periods.  This result is likely 
to be different when the market structure is not monopoly.  
 
 
4. Duopoly in the second period 
 
 We now consider the evolution of monopoly to duopoly.   We keep the market as 
a monopoly in the first period.  We assume that in the second period, in addition to the 
existing durable good provided by the monopolist, a new durable good is introduced by 
an entrant.  We assume that the new good is of a different quality level than the original 
one, and has only partial network externalities with the “old” durable good. 
 
In the first period, only the monopolized good is sold.  In the second period, there are two 
goods: the “old” durable good (good #2) provided by the old monopolist, and the “new” 
good introduced by the competitor (good #3).  The monopolist’s good in period 2 is 
identical with the one in period 1.  As earlier, we denote by  k  the degree of network 
externalities under full compatibility.  Let  m  be the degree of network externalities 
realized to good 1 from the partial forward compatibility between the “new” good and the 
“old” good 2.  Let  n  be the intensity of network externalities to a good 3 consumer from 
sales of good 1 or 2 (arising from partial backward compatibility).  Figure 1 shows the 
operating systems and the degrees of compatibility.  We also assume that the new good 
has a quality difference of  q  compared to the old one. 
 
A consumer of willingness to pay (type)  a  who buys in period 1 receives utility 
 
u1 = a - p1 + k(d1 + d2b) + md3b. 
 
The respective utilities to a consumer of willingness to pay (type) a (discounted to period 
1) who buys in period 2 from the monopolist (good 2) or the entrant (good 3) are 
 
u2 = b[a - p2 + k(d1 + d2) + md3], 
 
u3 = b[a(1 + q) – p3 + n(d1 + d2) + kd3)], 
 
respectively. 
 
 9 
 We define the marginal consumer between goods 1 and 2 as  a12, the marginal 
consumer between goods 2 and 3 as  a23, and the consumer who is marginal between 
good 3 and not buying as  a30.  We define implicitly demand functions: 
 
d1 = 1 - a12(d1, d2, d3), 
 
d2 = a12(d1, d2, d3) - a23(d1, d2, d3), 
 
d3 = a23(d1, d2, d3) - a30(d1, d2, d3). 
 
As before, we find the fixed point of the above mapping to define the demand 
functions in each period: 
 
d1 = d1(p1, p2),   d2 = d2(p1, p2, p3),   d3 = d3(p2, p3). 
 
The monopolist maximizes profits, ΠM = p1d1 + p2d2, while the entrant maximizes  ΠE = 
p3d3.  Because the expressions are very complicated, we present here only the results for 
certain values of the parameters, that is, for  n = k  and as  q  tends to zero.  That is, we 
present results for the case when the partial backward compatibility externality is the 
same for goods 2 and 3, and goods 2 and 3 do not have a significant quality difference.  
Nash equilibrium prices  p1* , p2*, p3*  and sales d1* , d2*, d3* are positive only when  m > 
k, i.e., when the new product has very strong externalities arising from forward 
compatibility.16 
 
 We find that the entrant has strong incentives to maximize both backward and 
forward compatibility,  
 
dΠE*/dn > 0,   dΠE*/dm > 0. 
 
In contrast, the monopolist has a divided view toward compatibility.  We find that 
 
dΠM*/dn < 0,   dΠM*/dm > 0. 
 
                                                 
16  Equilibrium prices and sales are: 
 
p1*  = (3 - 3b - 4k - 4gk + m + 3bm + gm + 3bgm)/[2(3 - 4k - 4gk + m + gm)], 
 
p2*  =  2(1 + g)(m - k)/(3 - 4k - 4gk + m + gm), 
 
p3*  = (1 + g) (m - k)/(3 - 4k - 4gk + m + gm), 
 
d1*  = 1/[2(1 - k)], 
 
d2*  = (1 + 4g - m – gm)/[2(1 - k)(3 - 4k - 4gk + m + gm)], 
 
d3*  = (1 + g)/(3 - 4k - 4gk + m + gm). 
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Thus, the monopolist wants the competitors’ good to be compatible with its own, so it 
receives the network externalities (forward compatibility externalities) of the 
competitor’s good but does not want its own good to be compatible with that of the 
competitor, so that network externalities accruing to the competitor because of backward 
compatibility are minimized.  
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 We find that a monopolist selling a durable good with network externalities, such 
as a computer operating system, in a finite period setting, is likely to set its price 
significantly above cost.  Thus, we expect that the Coase conjecture will not hold in the 
operating systems market. 
 
 As is well known, the durable goods monopolist does not increase price over 
time.  However, we find that introduction of new goods which have variable degrees of 
network externalities to older ones could lead the monopolist to increase price over time.   
 
 A monopolist facing the threat of future entry that would drive prices to marginal 
cost in future periods, will charge significantly less than a monopolist that does not face 
such threat.  The extent of the threat depends on the degree of compatibility of the 
entrants’ products with the products of the incumbent monopolist.   
 
The entry of one competitor is successful (in the sense of bring positive profits to 
the entrant) only if the entrant’s product has very strong externalities arising from 
forward compatibility.  The entrant wishes to maximize both forward and backward 
compatibility, while the incumbent wants to maximize forward compatibility but 
minimize backward compatibility of the entrant’s product. 
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Appendix 
 
n-Period Durable Goods Monopoly With Network Externalities 
 
Let a durable good be sold in each of  n > 2 periods.  A consumer who buys in 
period j, j = 1, …, n,  receives utility  
 
Uj = bj-1(a – pj + k(d1 + d2 + … + dj) + k(bjdj+1 + … + bn-1dn). 
 
The marginal consumer between goods j and j+1, aj,j+1 ,  is defined by  
 
Uj = Uj+1 . 
 
The solution of  
Un = 0, 
 
an,0 ,  defines the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying good n and not 
buying at all.  
 
Demand is defined by  
 
d1 = 1 - a1,2  
 
dj = aj-1,j - aj,j+1 , j = 2, …, n-1 
 
dn = an-1,n – an,0 . 
 
Using the definition of aj,j+1 , we have: 
 
(1 – b) aj,j+1 = pj - bpj+1 – (1 - b)k (d1 + d2 + … + dj). 
 
Since  
 
d1 + d2 + … + dj = 1 – aj,j+1 , 
 
it follows that  
 
 aj,j+1 = [pj - bpj+1 – (1 - b)k]/[(1 - k)(1 - b)],  j = 1, …, n-1 
 
and 
 
d1 = 1 - [(p1 – bp2) – k(1 – b)]/[(1 - k)(1 - b)] = 1/(1 - k) - (p1 – bp2)/[(1 - k)(1-b)], 
 
dj = (pj-1 – (1 + b)pj + bpj+1)/[(1 - k)(1 - b)],  j = 2, …, n-1, 
 
dn  = (pn-1 – pn)/[(1 - k)(1 - b)]. 
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Maximizing profits 
 
ΠM = ∑j bj-1 pj dj 
 
with respect to  pj  requires 
 
dΠM/dp1 = d1 + (bp2 - p1)/[(1 - k)(1 - b)] = 0, 
 
dΠM/dpj = bj-1{dj + [pj-1- pj(1 + b) + bpj+1]/[(1 - k)(1 - b)]} = 0, j = 2, …, n-1, 
 
dΠM/dpn = bn-1{dn + (pn-1 – pn)/[(1 - k)(1 - b)]} = 0, 
 
which is solved by  
 
pj = ½, all j, d1 = 1/[2(1 - k)],   dj = 0, j ≠ 1. 
 
It is easy to show that this solution is unique. 
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Figure 1: We denote the monopolist’s
operating system in period i, i=1, 2, as OSi.
The entrant sells OS3 in period 2. The letters
k, m and n denote full, forward, and
backward compatibility with the various
applications.
